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claims thus disposed of, as the rules laid down in the special convention of 1923
were susceptible of interpretation in a sense hardly consonant with the great
principle of the equality of nations, according to which, as Chief Justice Mar-
shall well said, "Russia and Geneva have equal rights." "Power or weakness,"
declared Vattel, "does not in this respect produce any difference."
Of international law, the adjudication of claims and controversies by inter-
national tribunals, usually arbitral in form and in constitution, should be one of
the chief sources. As Judge Nielsen points out, such tribunals, generally speak-
ing, finally adjudicate differences which diplomacy has failed to solve, and which,
although the amount of muney at stake may be small, presumptively involve
questions of law the decision of which may have far-reaching effects. In any
event such decisions should tend to make certain and to stabilize the law. For
these reasons it is highly important that the members of such tribunals should
be chosen with the greatest care, and solely with reference to their qualifications
for the performance of international judicial functions. They should be impar-
tial, without special predilection for one nation as against another; they should
know international law in that real and comprehensive sense which does not,
by treating the law prior to 1914 as obsolete, put a premium on ignorance and
raise propagandists to the rank of oracles; they should also, as far as possible,
be men of experience in affairs, who are accustomed to deal with realities, and
to apply principles to concrete facts, rather than to pursue imaginary goods, or,
as Milton calls them, the faery visions that live in the colors of the rainbow.
The present volume is divided into two parts. The first part contains a
discussion of general principles the application of which is constantly invoked
in the adjudication of international claims. These embrace such questions as
the nature and sources of international law, and the rules by which it is to be
determined and applied; the right of "interposition" by a government in behalf
of its nationals, including the connotation of the term "denial of justice"; na-
tionality, whether single or dual, and the right of expulsion; the responsibility
of governments for injuries inflicted upon aliens by private persons, including
bandits and mobs; complaints arising out of false arrest, improper prosecution,
delays in trial and mistreatment in prison; the responsibility of governments
for acts of insurgents; the jurisdiction of governments over merchant vessels
in their territorial waters, and various questions relating to the procedure of
international tribunals and the rules of evidence which they apply. The second
and principal part of the volume contains opinions in international cases and,
as the title indicates, mainly in cases that have come before the commissions
under the conventions of 1923 between the United States and Mexico. To these
there is added the author's dissenting opinion in the Salem case, which was
lately adjudicated by an arbitral board of three members constituted under the
protocol between the United States and Egypt of January 20, 1931. The claim
was disallowed, but the United States arbitrator dissented from the conclusions
of his colleagues on certain points.
John Bassett Moore.t
JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, IN PARTICULAR OF THE RECOGNI-
TION OF FOREIGN POWERS. By Louis L. Jaffe. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1933. Pp. viii, 278. Price: $3.50.
In this sprightly volume, the author has undertaken to subject to critical
examination the occasionally professed dependence of the courts-principally
English and American-on the political departments of the government (pri-
marily the executive) in the determination of issues involving questions of for-
t Formerly Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice, The Hague.
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eign relations. He sustains vigorously the thesis, which in the last few years
has gained increasing currency, that the courts have shown too great a de-
pendence upon the executive, particularly in making their judgments as to the
capacity of foreign governments to sue and as to the legal effect to be given to
laws and administrative acts of such governments, depend upon the irrelevant
fact of the political recognition or non-recognition of these governments by the
executive of the forum. Interest in the subject was doubtless stimulated by
the gyrations of American courts in seeking to pay deference to the govern-
mental policy which refused so long to recognize the Bolshevik government of
Russia, and which, down to 1922, assumed to recognize instead Kerensky's
ambassador as the authorized spokesman for Russia. The author exhibits an
acute power of analysis and with other critics of the New York decisions may
derive satisfaction from the recent judgments of the Court of Appeals in
Salinzoff v. Standard Oil Co.,' and Goldberg-Rudkowsky v. Equitable Life Ins.
Co.,2 both disavowing the factor of political recognition or non-recognition as a
criterion for giving or refusing legal effect to Soviet laws and decrees.
The book is divided into four principal chapters: (i) a general background
on Political Questions in Cases Involving International Relations so far as they
arise in the courts, and especially questions of sovereign immunity, neutrality,
interpretation of treaties and statutes affecting the prize courts; (2) the theory
and practice of recognition as a political act; (3) the effect of non-recognition
in the courts on the status and rights of the unrecognized state or government
as plaintiff or defendant and on the validity accorded to the laws and acts of the
unrecognized government in their internal and external manifestations; (4)
recognition and the courts. The author deals with so many important topics,
both theoretical and practical, that in a brief review attention can be given only
to a few matters. He seeks to show, if possible, when the courts should
legitimately follow the executive and when they should profess independence.
It is a worthy goal, and for the author's lucid and challenging views which, on
the whole, are sound and sensible, he is entitled to much credit. But the treat-
ment is not very systematic. He jumps from thought to thought in an often
baffling fashion, yet his style is stimulating and attractive and sustains the
reader's interest.
On the question of "constitutional understandings", 3 I should not have
thought it doubtful that when the President and Senate conclude a treaty the
House of Representatives is legally bound to execute it, even by the appropria-
tion of money; they have no option to refuse. They can, of course, physically
violate a treaty, but this is not legally privileged. Prize courts 4 are, of course,
bound by legislative decrees and orders in council, and though it is quite true
that when these violate international law the prize courts will not then be ad-
ministering international law, the fact remains. The remedy for legislative as
for judicial breaches of international law is through the diplomatic channel or
international arbitration, so that in a legal system the rule of international law
must ultimately prevail over a contrary municipal law. Occasional physical vio-
lations of this rule do not militate against its validity. The Zanwra,5 dealt only
with the exceptional and rare prerogative order in council, not a legislative order
in council; 6 but the decision was used by the official and unofficial propaganda
i. 262 N. Y. 220, I86 N. E. 679 (I933).
2. 266 N. Y. ('935).
3. Pp. 9-12.
4. PP. 41-51.
5. Pp. i6, 28, 43-50.
6. For a description of the distinction between the two, see JENKS, SOURCES AND JUDICIAL
ORGANIZATION OF ENGLISH LAW (1931) 18-20.
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in the late war to bolstei the legally unsustainable legislative orders in council
which mocked international law. In no case did or could a British prize court
set aside these important orders in council or disregard them. The author cor-
rectly plays down recognition as a criterion of legal results, and even as an
operative political fact. On the contrary, he is correct in exposing the dangerous
tendency to use non-recognition as a form of political reprisal in the pursuit of
Noble Impulses, more likely to promote further chaos and war. But he is brash,
to say the least, in suggesting 7 that our most profound international lawyer and
statesman, John Bassett Moore, ought to revise his conception that the United
States actually did recognize the Soviets in concluding with them the Kellogg
Pact, especially when the author himself concedes that the word "recognition"
has been used to express various ideas from the admission of existence to the
formal exchange of diplomatic representatives.
The author might have said more about the de facto government (a con-
stitutional term), whose acts within its own territory should be deemed judicially
unchallengable in foreign courts, regardless of recognition; the assumption of
the Oetjen case as to the "retroactivity of recognition" places the admission of
validity or the impropriety of foreign judicial challenge on the wrong ground.
On the effect to be given to the laws of an unrecognized state or government
the author severely attacks 8 the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals,
which seemed to conclude that political non-recognition warranted refusal to
give the Soviet decrees or acts legal effect, even on property or corporations in
Russia. Public policy in New York might well have warranted refusal to give
extra-territorial effect to some of these decrees so far as they concern property
in New York, but this doctrine applies equally to the laws of a recognized state
or government. Courts need follow the Executive only where it would be
politically awkward to differ, as in the determination of the political status or
territorial boundaries of a foreign state or on the existence of a treaty; but in
the administration of justice, the court should remain free from political con-
trol and hew close to the line of actual facts so as to promote legal order and
protection. The author has taken pains to penetrate the underlying philosophical
reasons for judicial independence and the justification for drawing the line where
independence should begin. On the effect of war on treaties 0 the case of
Flensburger Dampfercompagnie v. United States 10 has been overlooked. The
author may be optimistic" in estimating the opportunities "for the conquest of
international politics by the judicial temperament". A few typographical errors,'2
do not mar a book which may be ranked as a genuine contribution to its subject.
Edwin M. Borchard.t
CASES ON LABOR LAw. By James M. Landis. The Foundation Press, Inc., Chi-
cago, 1934. Pp. xiv., 718. Price: $7.50.
This book was announced for publication in the spring of 1933 just before
the author was appointed a Federal Trade Commissioner, to become, a year
later, an original member of the Securities and Exchange Commission. During
these first months that Professor Landis was in Washington, new national leg-
islation and a series of administrative decisions had so enriched the law of labor
j Professor of Law, Yale University.
7. P. 118.
8. Pp. 162-198.
9. PP. 1, 77.
7o. 73 Ct. Cl. 646 (1932).
1i. P. 38.
12. P. 145, 1903 for 1913; p. 147, "inimicable"; p. 219, B. for R.
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